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Robots and smart software have an increasing impact on our
lives, and they make decisions that might have a profound
effect on our welfare. Some of these decisions have a moral
dimension. Hence, we need to consider whether (a) we want
them making such decisions, and (b) if affirmative, how we
proceed in equipping machines with ‘‘moral sensitivity’’ or
even with ‘‘moral decision-making abilities.’’
Wallach and Allen make an eloquent and forceful
case that we should seriously consider granting machines
such decision-making power in their book, Moral machine,
teaching robots right from wrong. Their argument
(in Chaps. 1 and 2) is that machines are deployed in situ-
ations in which they make decisions that have a moral
impact. Hence we should extend them with moral sensi-
tivity to the moral dimensions of the situations in which the
increasingly autonomous machines will inevitably find
themselves. This may lead to machines making moral
decisions. The machines they refer to may be anything
from software, softbots to robots, and in particular com-
binations of these. Through interconnected and open sys-
tems situations might arise that are neither desirable nor
were they foreseeable when the systems were designed.
Whether we can actually build such systems Chap. 3) is
still an open question. If we were to engineer artificially
moral systems, would they count as truly moral systems?
Wallach and Allen conclude (Chap. 4) by noting that
human and artificial morality will be different, but that
there is no reason a priori to rule out the notion of artificial
morality. Moreover, they argue that the very attempt to
construct artificial morality will prove worthwhile for all
involved.
Raising these points is the first, and possibly the great-
est, strength of their book. It puts the theme squarely on the
agenda. Yet, theirs is also a book of open and unanswered
questions. On virtually all topics, the verdict is still out, as
no common opinions have been established, no approaches
proven, and no answers found. Their book also serves to
illustrate how young this field of research still is. Though at
times it is a little disconcerting to find yet again that the
answer (one of these open questions) might be A, but then
again, it might not.
Writing a book that touches on several research
domains—in this case moral philosophy, robotics, software
developing, and neuroscience—is always a hazardous
enterprise. The risk of not providing enough depth and thus
losing the attention of specialists in either domain is
present. The specialist will be lost unless there is enough to
be learned from other domains to provide a fresh per-
spective on the research in his own domain.
Providing an overview of the research on artificial
morality—moral philosophy and machine decision-
making—is a tall order. Though the field is relatively new,
there is already much and widely varied research being
conducted, which ranges from moral learning algorithms
and various logics to model moral decision-making, and
from neural nets to nano-technology.
Overall, the book provides a good overview of most of the
current research in the field, nicely setting the stage in Chap.
5 for a discussion of the relationship between engineer and
philosopher; and the cooperation between the two raises
various issues that occupy the remainder of the book,
including questions such as: Who or what is leading? How
can philosophers formulate their theories such that engineers
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can actually implement them? Which moral philosophies
should we use in constructing artificial moral agents?
Chapter Six discusses various top-down, rule-based
approaches, whereas Chap. 7 discusses organic and emer-
gent bottom-up approaches. Possible mixes of the two are
discussed in Chap. 8. Chapter Nine contains an overview of
individual research programmes currently underway. The
inclusion or use of affective and emotional approaches is
discussed in Chap. 10. Key issues in this chapter include
concerns about the extent that emotions and social skills
are necessary for moral behaviour, and about whether
robots can be said to be moral if they are lacking in this
respect. Chapter Eleven touches on the wider picture of
artificial intelligent beings: AGIs (artificial general intelli-
gence), also addressing some of the (dis)similarities
between human and artificial morality. Turning AMAs
(artificial moral agents) into beings that resemble human
moral behaviour requires a much broader architectural
framework, and this chapter discusses several of these
frameworks and the issues associated with them.
In closing, Chap. 12 discusses futuristic scenarios and
asks what our approach towards artificial moral systems
might be. For example, will we (need to) assign them rights
and duties? Will fear, punishment or shame have meaning
in relation to robots? And what stance should politicians
and legislators take towards these questions? This set of
questions could be construed as providing the second main
benefit or strength of the book. At times, however, the
discussion remains very much at the surface. The specialist
will not find anything new, while the uninitiated have too
little with which to be satisfied. At best, the authors have
provided a reference for where to look for further material.
Yet, this is, in itself, already a benefit to book’s readers.
One concern that the reader may have with this book is
that the discussion, at times, gives the impression that the
authors are far from fluent on the topic under discussion.
This, in itself, is not surprising, and it is certainly no
reproach given the range of topics. However, it can become
problematic in cases where certain statements either go
unreferenced or are controversial (and thus need further
clarification and support). This particular flaw might easily
put off some readers who happen to be better versed on the
particular topic. An example is the authors’ claim that
‘‘…smell and touch […] supply information that is ger-
mane to making moral decisions.’’ (p. 150). Also, their
decision to use ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ interchangeably
without further clarification, and not to discuss the dis-
tinction between ethics and meta-ethics leaves them open
to dismissal, or at least significant criticism, from moral
philosophers. In a book on Moral machines, a few more
pages could have been dedicated to making these critical
distinctions more clear. Something similar also happens
when the large number of modal logics is explained by the
large number of moral theories (p. 126), instead of
explaining the number of modal logic models by the
number of moral theories, and the number of modal logics
by meta-logical considerations. These points do not affect
the overall project of the book, and they might not be
relevant to all of the intended readership. Nonetheless, they
might distract some readers and raise some potential con-
cerns on the representation regarding the various positions.
That the main driver for their book is not univocal or
undisputed becomes clear in the first chapters in their book
where they provide a fairly even-handed overview of
arguments in favour and arguments against granting
machines increasing decision-making powers. However, it
is clear that, in their view, not considering and researching
this option is dangerous because the development of
technology will progress and the machine will be making
(moral) decisions that affect us. One of the omissions of the
book is not discussing the position of two of the most vocal
opponents to their position: Johnson and Grodzinsky. One
of the counter claims that Wendell and Allen’s critics make
is that the authors’ position attributes to technological
development a misleading autonomy. Critics argue that it
is, in fact, we humans who drive these technological
developments. And, some critics further argue that we
(humans) can chose to stop them, or to continue, which is
itself a moral decision. We can also decide not to pursue
the development of technologies that have great risks
attached to them.
Following a discussion of the arguments both in favour
and against machines making decisions with moral aspects,
the authors discuss the various ways in which engineers
and moral philosophers might cooperate and approach the
issue. These range from the top-down approaches, where
basically rules are derived from moral theories, to leads
taken from how humans ‘learn’ to behave morally.
The chapter on the various approaches towards actually
constructing machines that make moral decisions show
how broad the range of techniques and approaches is.
Though the point is not explicitly made, it shows in par-
ticular how all the research projects address only a limited
sub-set of aspects relevant to artificial moral decision-
making. This is an important observation to be kept in
mind by the researchers involved in this field.
Particularly interesting is the chapter where Wallach and
Allen raise the question of how moral decision-making
relates to ‘‘embodiment’’ and whether artificial moral
decision-making should be extended with emotional and
sensory components. This chapter nicely illustrates how the
project of machine morality can help frame and investigate
moral philosophical questions.
The subtitle of the book, Teaching robots right from
wrong, is a catchy and beautiful sub-title. It is also some-
what misleading, however, because no-one is being taught
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right from wrong. If anything emerges from the book’s
discussions on the topic of learning it is the impression that
we still have a very long way to go. At best, we now have
only a hunch about how we might go about teaching robots
right from wrong. We certainly do not yet have a clear-set
view on how to achieve this, and certainly there are no
current ‘‘artificial pupils’’ capable of learning.
An important topic that is missing from the book is
moral epistemology. Although it is a topic that might prove
to be the hardest nut to crack, it is also one that is essential
to any machine-based moral decision-making and to
‘learning morality’. How is a robot to attribute moral
meaning to a physical act that it perceives? Giving some-
one a thumb on the shoulder might be a friendly act of
camaraderie by a pal from college, but also be viewed as an
act of aggression when it concerns a supporter of a com-
peting basketball team. Knowing how to interpret such
actions, and next how to classify them, from a moral per-
spective is key to creating any kind of moral machine and
thus is a theme that should be discussed more thoroughly in
this book. To Wallach and Allen’s credit, it is touched upon
in Chap. 10, for example. But moral epistemology is a
broad topic and clearly deserves explicit discussion. It is
also a theme that would lead the authors back to some
meta-ethical discussions that the book avoids, such as ‘Are
moral properties supervenient on physical properties or are
they social conventions?’ These kinds of questions can
have a big impact when deciding how to engineer moral
decision-making. That such questions are missing from the
book might be a reflection of the state of the research on
machine morality.
As an introduction into the field of artificial morality and
machines-based moral decision-making, Moral machines is
a clear success. It outlines most issues pertinent to the new
field, and paints a clear picture of how daunting the task of
creating moral machines is. Although it might lack the
depth to become the field’s standard reference book, it
certainly is a welcome introduction. I recommend it both as
an overview of what is happening in numerous fields of
research and as a quick pointer to that research. One thing
that the book does well is teaching the supposed teachers of
machines just how difficult their subject matter is.
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